Diana Shipping withdraws Genco takeover offer after board demands $36.91 a share

91 Per Share — a 57% Premium to Genco’s Undisturbed Share Price at the Time of Diana’s Last Offer Genco’s Demands Are Completely Disconnected from the Reality of What a Credible Buyer Could Reasonably Be Expected to Pay Shareholders Should Question Whose Interests Their Board Is Actually Serving By Making Demands That Can’t Possibly Be Met, Shareholders are Effectively Being Prevented from Realizing an Attractive Premium, As Board Makes its Misalignment with Shareholders and Primary Focus on its Personal Interests Crystal Clear Diana Remains Genco's Largest Shareholder and Will Continue to Raise These Issues and Hold the Board Accountable for Every Commitment It Has Made.

ATHENS, Greece, Aug. 14, 2026 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- Diana Shipping Inc. 54 based on Diana's 30-day volume-weighted average price as of June 16, 2026. Diana continues to have significant conviction in the strategic and financial merits of a combination with Genco, but is withdrawing its offer because the Genco Board has adopted a position that Diana believes no credible acquiror could realistically meet and that raises serious and legitimate questions about whether the Genco Board's interests remain aligned with those of Genco's shareholders.

The Genco Board's demands were first conveyed in a meeting with Genco’s financial advisor on August 13, 2026, after which they were reviewed by the Diana Board of Directors. The demands were then reiterated in a letter to Diana dated August 14, 2026. 00 per share in dividends (reflecting payouts for the third and fourth quarters of 2026 based on Genco's own dividend guidance), and three Diana shares per Genco share. 91 per Genco share, representing a 42% premium to Genco’s August 13, 2026 closing share price and a 57% per share premium to Genco’s closing share price on June 16, 2026, the day prior to Diana’s most recent offer.

00 per share in future dividends and nearly half the combined entity's upside. Genco shareholders deserve to understand why the Genco Board has adopted this position, the financial analysis that supports it, and how management intends to deliver equivalent or superior value if Genco remains independent. The answer to those questions may lie in a simple and uncomfortable reality. By going to all lengths to avoid a transaction, management keeps its positions, its compensation, and its control.

Shareholders, on the other hand, lose the opportunity to receive a substantial and certain premium at a high point in the shipping cycle. Those interests are completely misaligned, and shareholders should ask the Genco Board to explain precisely whose interests it was serving when it effectively rejected a credible, fully financed offer by making price demands that no credible buyer could meet. This concern is compounded by the Genco Board's track record of using convoluted valuations to support its own interests.

Diana's proposals have consistently been based on the same VesselsValue broker valuations Genco itself used for more than five years, including to calculate fleet values in its Q4 2025 earnings presentation published in February 2026. 50 per share. 00 per share using asset values from VesselsValue. As such, Genco’s demand represents a premium of at least 46% to those NAV estimates.

Further, the NAV figures Genco touts fail to account for the cost of selling its fleet and liquidating the company, including brokerage fees and the significant severance expense Genco would incur under its recently adopted "retention plan", which itself benefits management at shareholders' expense. The Genco Board is using self-serving and misleading NAV figures to manufacture a basis for rejection, preserve management's positions, and further entrench itself rather than maximizing value for the shareholders it is supposed to serve. Further, Genco management spent nearly $17 million of shareholder dollars in the first half of 2026 to protect their personal interests.